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Abstract
Modern philosophy left us with an unbridgeable divide between factual reality 
and the domain of values (normativity). This article first of all analyze modal 
norms, such as the principle of avoiding what is legally excessive. There are 
distinct but mutually cohering kinds of laws. The distinction between modal 
laws / norms and type laws / norms required an example from the domain of 
human society – John Locke and Adam Smith, whose ideas in practice gave 
birth to trade unionism and labour parties. The idea of an “invisible hand” 
(manifest in the “free market”) operates with exact (natural) laws, such as 
supply and demand. When modal norms are distinguished from type norms it 
becomes clear that states and a business enterprises can act uneconomically 
by wasting their money although they ought to function in a way that is guided 
by economic considerations of frugality. As an example the well-known natural 
law of energy-conservation is explained as the embodiment of an analogical 
link between the physical aspect and the kinematic aspect which should rather 
be designated as the law of energy-constancy. Finally the problem of 
normativity is related to the coherence between the logical-analytical aspect 
and its coherence with the aspects of number and space – focused on the 
principle of the excluded middle and its implications for diverging schools of 
thought within twentieth century mathematics. The last subsection concludes 
with reference to the norms guiding technological developments and with an 
assessment of the meaning of technology.
Keywords: Fact and value, normativity, modal norms, typical norms, supply 
and demand, frugality, natural laws, cultural norms, schools of thought, 
physics and mathematics
1. INTRODUCTION
In this article the interconnection between science, technology, engineering 
and mathematics will be elucidated by taking into consideration the 
perspective provided by a systematic account of the meaning of “law.” This will 
be done against the background of the history of the idea of law and its affinity 
with the idea of a world order (Strauss, 2012). The rise of the modern 
mathematical natural sciences exerted an immense influence upon 
technology and engineering (STEM). This influence emerged through a 
transition that took place during Ancient Greek and the Medieval period, one in 
which the concept of law eventually acquired a more restricted meaning. First 
of all it was directed towards an understanding of human society and the way 
in which it is normed. 
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But during the Renaissance early modernity overextended the natural 
scientific concept of law foremost exemplified in the concept of causality. 
However, this development turned into a threat of human freedom. As a result 
by and large modern philosophy adhered to a negative understanding of 
freedom: freedom was negatively conceived of as being free from causal 
determination. This article aims at developing an alternative view.
2. 'IS' AND 'OUGHT': ARE THEY SEPARATED BY AN 
UNBRIDGEABLE ABYSS?
Immanuel Kant realized that the deterministic understanding of causality of 
the modern science ideal eliminates human freedom. He therefore postulated 
two realms, corresponding to his distinction between “thing-in-itself” and 
“appearance”. This subtle but basic distinction used by Kant serves to secure 
a separate (super-sensory) domain for the human being as an autonomous 
ethical aim-in-itself (Zelbstzweck). Kant holds that the category of cause and 
effect can only be applied to appearances and not to things-in-themselves 
(such as the free will of the human soul, see his argument in Kant 1787-B:XVII-
XVIII). This explains at once his aim, namely “to point out that since the 
thorough-going connection of all appearances, in a context of nature, is an 
inexorable law, the inevitable consequence of obstinately insisting on the 
reality of appearances is to destroy all freedom. Those who thus follow the 
common view have never been able to reconcile nature and freedom.” When 
this distinction collapses freedom also fails: “The common but fallacious 
presupposition of the absolute reality of appearances here manifests its 
injurious influence, to the confounding of reason. For if appearances are 
things in themselves, freedom cannot be upheld” (Kant, 1787-B: 564).
It was therefore Kant who laid the foundation for the general restriction of 
“science” to physics and mathematics. These disciplines advanced by 
claiming that they are “objective” and “neutral”. By contrast, “faith” was placed 
within the domain of practical reason (the domain of the ethical). The outcome 
of this legacy is given in the well-known opposition of “science” and “faith” – we 
merely have to recall Kant's statement: “Therefore I had to restrict knowledge 
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in order to make room for faith.”
This dualism between nature and freedom, which came to expression in the 
above-mentioned apparently innocent distinction, namely that between 
essence (thing-in-itself) and appearance, inspired Kant to proclaim the 
separate existence of two realms, each with its own law-giver. The latter is 
assumed to be a priori in nature. On the one hand we find human 
understanding which acts as a priori law-giver for nature as sensory object 
and for theoretical knowledge of nature in a possible experience. Reason on 
the other hand is the a priori law-giver for freedom (with its own causality). It 
concerns what is supra-sensory in the human subject – and it provides 
unconditional practical knowledge. 
 1
“Ich mußte also das Wissen aufheben, um zum Glauben Platz zu bekommen” (Kant, 1787-B:xxx). [“I had to restrict knowledge in order to 
make room for faith.”]
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The domain of the nature concept under the one and the domain of the 
freedom concept under the other legislation are mutually exclusive and 
cannot, according to its own laws, have an effect on each other. This is a 
consequence of the large split totally separating them – the divide between the 
supra-sensory and appearances. The freedom concept determines nothing in 
respect of theoretical knowledge of nature, just like the nature concept does 
not determine anything in respect of the practical laws of freedom: and in this 
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regard it is impossible to bridge the two domains.
Surely, the modern philosophical dualism between nature and freedom could 
not be phrased more aptly than Kant who underscores two separated law-
givers, understanding and reason, attached to each domain. But already in 
the extensive quotation given in the previous footnote the assumed 
unbridgeable opposition of nature (causality) and freedom is not upheld, for 
we read of “freedom with its own causality” [“die Freiheit und ihre eigene 
Kausalität”].
This Kantian dualism between the (deterministic) sphere of natural causality 
(cause and effect) and the supra-sensory (ethical) sphere of ought-to-be was 
in neo-Kantianism transformed by their idea of values in the thought of Rickert, 
Windelband and Weber. What became known as the hermeneutical turn, with 
its emphasis on understanding (verstehen), convinced many scholars within 
the humanities to reject the concept of causality in the social sciences. But just 
as little as Kant succeeded in avoiding the notion of causality within the 
domain of “freedom” was it possible to pursue this espistemic maxim 
consistently within the humanities. It soon turned out that social scientists 
simply had to use terms which analogically reflect the meaning of the various 
natural aspects of reality. The inevitable effect of these connections was that it 
turned out to be impossible to avoid norming laws within the humanities, as 
well as within the natural sciences, technology and engineering (see 
paragraph 9 below).
3. BRIDGING THE GAP: INTER-MODAL CONNECTIONS
In 1942 the sociologist, R.M. MacIver, wrote a book with the title: Social 
Causation. In its physical meaning the term causality (cause and effect) 
indeed does not reveal any connotation related to normativity. Yet physical 
causes and physical effects may be contemplated in such a way that both 
determinism and indeterminism are avoided. Whatever happens is caused 
(granting an element of the claim of determinism), but what the outcome will 
be need not be fixed in advance (granting an element of the claim of 
indeterminism). 
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“Der Verstand ist a priori gesetzgebend für die Natur als Objekt der Sinne, zu einem theoretischen Erkenntnis derselben in einer möglichen 
Erfahrung. Die Vernunft ist a priori gesetzgebend für die Freiheit und ihre eigene Kausalität, als das Übersinnliche in dem Subjekte, zu einem 
unbedingt-praktischen Erkenntnis. Das Gebiet des Naturbegriffs, unter der einen, und das des Freiheitsbegriffs, unter der anderen 
Gesetzgebung, sind gegen allen wechselseitigen Einfluß, den sie für sich (ein jedes nach seinen Grundgesetzen) auf einander haben 
konnten, durch die große Kluft, welche das Übersinnliche von den Erscheinungen trennt, ganzlich abgesondert. Der Freiheitsbegriff bestimmt 
nichts in Ansehung der theoretischen Erkenntnis der Natur; der Naturbegriff eben sowohl nichts in Ansehung der praktischen Gesetze der 
Freiheit: und es ist in sofern nicht möglich, eine Brücke von einem Gebiete zu dem andern hinüberzuschlagen” (Kant, 1790:B LIII-LIV, § IX, 
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft B Edition, pages 270-271).
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Speaking of social causes and social effects certainly analogically reflects the 
original physical meaning of causality. But since any genuine analogy is based 
upon similarities and differences, it is possible to show that social causality 
reveals in what is similar with physical causality the difference between these 
instances of causality: physical causality brings to expression a natural law, 
where social causality reveals the normativity of human social actions.
Within the social aspect of reality we may distinguish between a norm side and 
a factual side and we may then point out that certain social actions ought to 
cause certain effects. For example, when children are disrespecting their 
parents, the ensuing effect, namely being reprimanded, cannot be envisaged 
apart from social causality – these children ought to be reprimanded, showing 
that the relation between cause and effect is displayed on the law side of the 
social aspect, in strict correlation with the cause-effect relation at the factual 
side of this aspect.
In a more general sense the physical (causal) analogy on the norm-side of the 
social aspect is manifest in the (causal) validity with which social norms are in 
force within the social spheres (spatial analogy) in which these norms are 
given a positive historical shape by individuals or social organs who are 
competent to accomplish this. This remark requires that we take cogniscance 
of the difference between natural laws that hold (are valid) per se, and norms 
for human conduct that require human intervention since they have to be 
made valid. Various scholars refer to the application of a norm or principle as 
positivizing it.
Social causation therefore clearly illustrates that the assumed Kantian abyss 
between the domains of nature and freedom is bridged through analogies of 
causality within all the normative aspects of reality, such as the logical-
analytical, cultural-historic, sign-mode, social aspect, economic, aesthetic, 
jural, moral and fiduciary (certitudinal) aspects. First of all we have to note that 
the normed character of these aspects are evinced in contraries like logical-
illogical, historical-unhistorical, clear-confused, polite-impolite, frugal-
wasteful, beautiful-ugly, legal illegal, moral-immoral, and certain-uncertain 
(confident/in doubt). Although we may have different views on what is (im-
)polite or (il-)legal, these contraries unequivocally demonstrate the 
normativity of the social and jural aspects.
Let us briefly investigate another instance of an analogy of physical causation 
within another normative aspect by looking at jural causality. It is striking that in 
general the science of law employs the idea of causality in a negative sense, 
namely in the sense of a breach (causing a damaging effect). However, when 
a civil legal contract is concluded according to the applicable civil legal 
stipulations, such an event may fully conform to the applicable positive legal 
rules. Jural causality therefore leaves open the causing of changes in legal life 
that may or may not conform to legal rules. 
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In other words, a factual agreement concerns a legal ground and a legal effect 
– an instance of norm-conformative jural causality. The other side of the coin is 
found in an example where an antinormative action takes place. Implicit in this 
example will be the insight that analogies on the norm side of any normative 
aspect represent fundamental modal norms or principles.
Within legal life legal subjects are expected to pursue their own legal interests 
in a thrifty way, thus avoiding any legal excesses. Dooyeweerd gives the 
following example:
The driver of a car, who, when another car approaches from a side-
street, continues driving on a road that gives the first-mentioned 
motorist the right of way, does not cause the subsequent accident 
when the same driver had no reason to expect that the other motorist 
would not yield. However, if the first motorist still continues to drive on, 
while having had the opportunity to stop in time after realizing that the 
other driver had disobeyed the traffic rules, then the loss-causing 
effect should also be imputed to the former's act since it is in conflict 
with the principle of jural economy and constitutes as such an 
excessive pursuit of one's own legal interest.
The jural implication is clear: “Every excessive, every unrestrained 
exploration of one's own legal interest, within legal life, is an interrupting 
causal intervention in the legal balance of interests against which the legal 
order reacts with restorative legal consequences” (Dooyeweerd, 1997:65).
The interconnection between the jural and economic modes of reality is here 
explained with reference to the causal analogy within the structure of the jural 
aspect as well. On the norm side of the jural aspect the economic analogy 
constitutes the legal principle according to which we ought to abstain from any 
legal excess in legal life. Avoiding legal excesses is a fundamental “inter-
aspectual” modal principle. It is comparable to other modal principles such as 
the logical principles of identity and non-contradiction (confusing what is 
distinct – numerical analogy – thus overstepping the normative appeal of 
these two logical principles), the principle of thought-economy (Occam's “ 
razor” – a forward-pointing economic analogy within the logical-analytical 
aspect), the principle of cultural-historical differentiation and integration (a 
biotic analogy within the cultural-historic aspect), the principle of aesthetic 
integrity (pointing towards the ethical), and so on.
In this context we ought to be reminded of what happened before and after the 
industrial revolution because this story is the outcome of confusing natural 
laws and normative principles. During the industrial revolution the excessive 
exploitation of machine technology gave rise to trade unionism and labour 
parties. 
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It was a reaction to the idea of Locke (laissez-faire, lassez passer – let them do 
as they wish) and to the view of the classical school in economics (Adam 
Smith and his successors) which subjected economic life to (assumed) exact 
laws of nature, such as the so-called law of supply and demand. The 
technicism of our age already caused Horkheimer to discern the “dialectic of 
the Enlightenment,” which is found in the negative effects of our control and 
domination of the natural environment, ultimately threatening the very 
conditions of life of humankind caused by the negative effects of our 
exploitation of nature (pollution of rivers, the air etc.).
The fact that antinormative human behaviour does affect our human 
environment calls for an understanding of the interconnections between the 
sphere of normativity guiding human life and the place of nature within this 
context. We proceed therefore with a more detailed account of the nature of 
norms and principles. It will turn out that even the genesis of tools and 
technology highlights the fact that within nature a point of connection is found 
for our awareness of normativity!
4. NORMS AND PRINCIPLES
From a purely historical perspective the origination and development of the 
concept of a norm interestingly also crosses the alleged abyss between 
nature and freedom (is and ought). Within the context of humankind's 
technical development the construction ruler (yardstick/ regula) emerged from 
nature itself. The only theoretician of architecture known from antiquity, 
Vetruv, used the term norma for the tool known as a trysquare. The German 
term is “Winkelmaß.” In 1548 W. Ryff introduced a subtle normative 
connotation attached to it by speaking of the justice of a Winkelmaß [“von der 
Gerechtigkeit des Winkelhaken”] (Hofmann, 1984:906). Cicero eventually 
appreciated nature as the norm for a law (“natura, quae norma legis est”). 
Already at this early stage law (lex) is equated with reason (ratio). Law is the 
highest ratio, impregnated in nature, ... the same ratio is law when it is 
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confirmed and shaped within the human mind (Cicero, De legibus, I, 18) . Ever 
since humans have associated the idea of a norm with a standard, measure or 
yardstick (reminscent of the operation of a water level gauge), it was 
accompanied by an awareness of what is correct or incorrect, norm-
conforming or antinormative.
Closely related to this legacy is the idea of a principle. Within Greek 
philosophy the term ἀρχή (Archè) was used to designate the first principles of 
the world. In the first part of his Metaphysics Aristotle even claims that pre-
Socratic philosophy by and large was in search after such a first principle. But 
in his commentary on Aristotle Simplicius of Cilicia, one of the last neo-
Platonists, implicitly denies that in general the early pre-Socratic philosophers 
employed the term Archè in a philosophical sense, because he mentions only 
Anaximander as someone who advanced such a philosophical idea. 
 3
Quoted by Hofmann, 1984:906-907. [“ … lex est ratio summa, insita in natura ... eadem ratio cum est in hominis mente confirmata et confecta, 
lex est.]







According to him “Anaximander said that the infinite is the principle and the 
element of whatever there is (ἀρχήν τε καὶ στοιχεῖον ... τῶν ὄντων) and he was 
the first to introduce the term Archè for this purpose” (Diels-Kranz, 1959-60-II, 
B. Fr. 1). However, there has been some controversy in this regard (see 
Aubenque, 1989:1336 and Kahn, 1964).
Plato advocates a harmonious coherence between the assumptions and 
conclusions of an argumentative process, because the consequences must 
be consistent (sumfonia; συμφωνία) with their point of departure (ἀρχή) (Plato, 
Phaedo, 101 d). Aristotle holds the view that the supreme science, “more 
authoritative than any ancillary science,” is philosophy, which has the task to 
investigate “the first principles and causes” (Metaph. 982 b 4-10). The 
principles are not solely physical in nature, since they encompass also logical 
principles, such as the principle of non-contradiction. In the Second Book, 
Chapter 19 of his Posterior Analytics Aristotle holds that “intuition will be the 
originative source of scientific knowledge” because “demonstration cannot be 
the originative source of demonstration.”
Thomas Hobbes continued the ambiguity in Aristotle's thought between the 
causes of existing things and the origin and cause (= principle) of knowledge 
(principium et causam cognitionis), namely when a proposition is expressed, 
such as the principle of non-contradiction (De Corpore, V, 12 – see Holzhey, 
1989:1357-1358). 
This reminds us of our earlier remark about contraries and the normed 
character of those aspects which reflect within their structure contraries 
analogous to the logical-illogical contrary – such as historical-unhistorical, 
clear-confused, polite-impolite, frugal-wasteful, beautiful-ugly, legal-illegal, 
moral-immoral, and certain-uncertain (confident/in doubt). These contraries 
reflect an underlying ontic normativity which is not constituted by the human 
subject, since the human subject is subjected to ontic principles or norms. 
From this perspective one may advance the idea that they are universally 
anchored in God's creational order. But they are merely given as the starting-
point for human action and therefore not yet applied or given a positive shape 
or form. This view avoids the dual validity contained in modern theories of 
natural law according to which principles (norms) possess an a priori validity, 
implying that prior to any positive legal sytem there are universally valid legal 
rules founded in human “reason.”
5. DISTINCT BUT MUTUALLY COHERING KINDS OF LAWS
In the previous paragraphs we have explored the analogical connections 
between various aspects of reality in order to demonstrate the untenability of 
the dualistic understanding of the domains of “nature” and “freedom.” Not only 
are there causal (physical) analogies to be found within all the normative 
aspects, since on the norm side of these aspects every analogical structural 
element highlights a fundamental modal norm or principle. 
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Although it is meaningful to distinguish between natural norms and cultural 
norms, this distinction does not coincide with the opposition of what is 
universal and individual. Wilhelm Windelband, from the neo-Kantian Baden 
school, uses the expressions nomothetic and idiographic in order to classify 
scientific disciplines (the “natural ” and the “cultural” sciences – Windelband, 
1924:145). Heinrich Rickert from the same school distinguished between 
generalizing natural sciences and (only initially) individualizing cultural 
sciences. He makes this distinction dependent upon a shift in the logical point 
of view: when empirical reality is viewed from the logical perspective of what is 
universal it becomes nature, and when it is observed from the logical point of 
view of what is individual it turns into history (Rickert, 1913:224). However, 
since universality is found both on the law side (norm side) and factual side of 
reality, its opposition to what is individual cannot be used to distinguish 
between “nature” and “culture.”
What happened within the neo-Kantian Baden school of thought transformed 
the initial Kantian dualism between is and ought into the currently still widely 
accepted dualism between facts and values. Scholars from the field of 
sociology brought this dualism to expression in a peculiar way. They identified 
society with what is factual and subsumed all the elements of normativity 
under a broad concept of culture, which is supposed to embrace values, 
meanings, symbols and norms. Sorokin considers the super-organic domain 
as being constructed by human beings and as constituted by “meanings and 
values superimposed upon the biophysical properties of interacting persons” 
(Sorokin, 1962:47). A few pages further Sorokin argues that the sphere of 
socio-cultural interaction is constituted by “society as the totality of interacting 
personalities, with their socio-cultural relationships and processes,” as well as 
“culture as the totality of the meanings, values and norms possessed by the 
interacting persons and the totality of the vehicles which objectify, socialize, 
and convey these meanings” (Sorokin, 1962:63).
The division between culture (norm-side) and society (the factual side) is also 
present in the thought of Parsons. He distinguishes between them as follows:
The social-system focus is on the conditions involved in the 
interaction of actual human individuals who constitute concrete 
collectivities with determinate membership. The cultural-system 
focus, on the other hand, is on 'patterns' of meaning, e.g., of values, of 
norms, of organized knowledge and beliefs, of expressive 'form' 
(Parsons, 1961:34).
Once this prevailing dualism between “is” and “ought” is overcome the 
inherent normativity of the post-sensory modal aspects illustrated above 
could be related to special norming laws holding for different kinds of societal 
entities. 
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Anticipating the examples which we will discuss below, it may be pointed out 
here that fundamental modal norms as well as typical norms serve only as 
starting-points, as points of departure, for giving shape to principles, for norm-
positivization. Something like the relation between social cause and social 
effect cannot be seen as something merely related to the factual-side of the 
social life. Due to the validity (i.e., being in force) of societal norms (correlated 
with social duties) we must point out that this validity demands (in a real 
normative way) that certain social events should occasion (i.e., cause) certain 
social effects.
In order to explore the dimension of typical normativity, i.e., of type laws, we 
first of all have to avoid the reduction of modal and typical laws to natural laws. 
This will be done by investigating two examples of a misunderstanding of the 
normative structural principle of the state in order to illustrate the normative 
meaning of a societal type law. The first one will briefly investigate how the 
absence of a delimited idea of the state may lead to a levelling of the difference 
between the state and other societal collectivities. The second one will briefly 
look at the whole-parts relation and then at the effect of subsuming economic 
life and the state to the law of supply and demand and to the physical idea of a 
general equilibrium already alluded to above.
5.1 Delimiting the state
A proper understanding of the nature of the state as a societal institution will 
have to take distance from the traditional separation of facts and values. In 
terms of our everyday experience of reality this basic dualism between fact 
(science) and value (faith), between nature and freedom, resulted in the 
untenable view that (scientific) knowing abstains from evaluating – which 
means that norms, principles and convictions are not intrinsic to theoretical 
endeavours. This conviction saw both science and technology as inherently 
“objective” and “neutral.” Yet, the history of Western civilization and of 
scholarly reflection on human society tells a different story.
Within Greek antiquity the prevalent view on human society is in the grip of the 
ideal to achieve form-perfection through education (Plato) and through an 
organic societal development (Aristotle). For this purpose both Plato and 
Aristotle extended the distinction of a whole and its parts beyond its limits, 
since they envisaged a society in which everything is subsumed to the state 
(polis) where humans are supposed to obtain their highest temporal 
perfection. The state was seen as a (totalitarian) whole encompassing all 
societal relationships. Aristotle proceeds from the family as germ-cell of 
society and ends with the city-state which will lead to moral perfection, with 
emphasis on the good citizen.
The Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition continued to exert its influence also within 
Protestant circles, especially in the thought of Abaraham Kuyper who still 
advanced the idea of “an organic right to vote” (organisch kiesrecht). 
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This view accepts the Aristotelian understanding according to which the 
family, as we mentioned, is the germ-cell of society – the line of development 
runs from the family via the village-communities into the polis (state). An 
isolated individual, according to Aristotle, “is not self-sufficing” and “therefore 
he is like a part in relation to the whole” since “he who is unable to live in 
society, or who has no need because he is sufficient for himself, must be either 
a beast or a god: he is not part of a state” (Politica 1253 a 27-29; Aristotle, 
2001:1130). This view is embedded in a teleological understanding of societal 
relationships, the telos (goal) precedes the parts.
The after-effect of this organological view in the thought of Kuyper is seen in 
his defense of the idea of an organic right to vote (“organisch kiesrecht”) – only 
the house-head is supposed to have the right to vote. The South African 
politician, Andries Treurnicht, who obtained a PhD on the thought of Kuyper, in 
an editorial of the newspaper Hoofstad (1969) discussed a tax issue in 
France. The question was whether or not the father should pay tax on behalf of 
self-supporting children still living at home. His proposal was that the father 
should pay tax on their behalf – “organic tax paying”!
However, if we apply the principle emphasized by Kuyper himself, namely that 
of sphere sovereignty, then it is clear that it is wrong to derive the function of a 
person in one particular societal entity from the role which such a person has 
in a different (sphere-sovereign) societal entity. Being a father is a role which 
belongs to the nuclear family and one cannot project this role onto the way in 
which co-determination and co-responsibility within the (democratic) state are 
structured.
Before the Second World War Europe witnessed the political consequences 
of similar misunderstandings which surfaced in what became known as 
syndicalism – a view also exploring the idea of an organic representation of 
the people. It resulted in a free structuring from bottom to top and in a fascistic 
(totalitaran) version from top to bottom. Surely, a Parliament constituted by the 
interests of societal collectivities that are in principle distinct from the state, is a 
recipe for anarchy, because the underlying pluralistic conception of the state 
dissolves the latter, as Dooyeweerd aptly remarks, into “a federation of 
essentially non-political societal collectivities lacking the mutual unity of a 
guideline typical of the state” (Dooyeweerd, 1935:109). 
At this point it is necessary to delineate the field of operation of the state both in 
respect of its coherence with non-state societal entities and in terms of its own 
intrinsic structural principle, with special reference to some elements of the 
economic history of the past two centuries. Exploring this issue briefly will add 
another perspective on the norming laws regulating human life and will pave 
the way in avoiding the confusion of differently natured principles or of their 
reduction to natural scientific modes of explanation. 
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In particular we shall see that the two aspects delimiting the field of 
investigation of the discipline of mathematics, namely number and space, 
provided diverging views of human society with the boundary-leveling tools of 
atomism (individualism) and holism (universalism).
5.2 Economic life and the task of the government
Our preceding analysis first of all highlighted the fact that the apparent divide 
between natural laws and cultural norms cannot be maintained, because 
analogies from natural aspects within the normative aspects (such as the 
physical analogy in jural causality) point at intermodal connections between 
the domains of nature and (normed) freedom.
Reflections on the nature of human society constantly moved from one 
extreme to another: traditional atomistic or individualistic approaches reduced 
all human societal relationships to mere individuals-in-interaction (thus 
overextending the explanatory power of the numerical aspect as a mode of 
explanation), while long-standing holistic or universalistic views always 
elevated one or another societal collectivity or community to become the all-
encompassing whole of which human beings are mere parts (thus 
overextending the explanatory power of the spatial whole-parts relation as 
mode of explanation).
A closer analysis immediately reveals the fact that both these theoretical 
approaches, namely an atomistic and a holistic one, actually merely explore 
the two most basic modes of explanation of the universe, traditionally related 
to the one-and-the-many and to a whole-with-its-parts. Unity and multiplicity 
are derived from the numerical aspect, while the whole-parts relation is first 
found within the spatial aspect of our experiential world. Clearly, there is no 
social form of life that is not co-constituted by the “one-in-the-many” and which 
is not bound together into a societal whole embracing its members as parts of 
this whole. Therefore each distinctly differentiated societal entity first of all can 
be characterized as a societal unity. The perspective of the spatial analogy in 
addition enables one to say that the unity of such a social life-form can be seen 
as a social whole or social totality. By adding the kinematical analogy the 
awareness of the social continuity (persistence over time) of such a life-form 
provides the basis for acknowledging social changes taking place within it (the 
physical analogy). The dynamic changes occurring in the on-going 
functioning of a social form of life allow individual members to come and go, 
without affecting the relative identity of the life-form concerned, thus 
demonstrating within the structure of the social aspect an analogy of 
thermodynamically open systems. The persistence and social development, 
social growth, of social entities require competent social organs capable of 
structuring societal relationships while exercising their social ordering will in 
such a way that the internal functioning of the life-form concerned could bring 
to expression an integrated social solidarity and social awareness (the 
perspective of the sensitive-psychical analogy within the social aspect). 
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This brief analysis shows that every aspect of nature, normally primarily 
experienced in connection with material things, plants and animals, denies a 
rift between “nature” and “freedom,” because these aspects provide the 
constitutive analogical links inherent to the structure of the social aspect.
The traditional science ideal consistently elevated one of the aspects of nature 
to become the exclusive mode of explanation of the entire universe. In 
addition to the one-sidedness of atomism and holism mentioned above, 
physicalism enthroned the law of causality, accompanied by the continued 
presence of vitalistic and psychologistic trends of thought.
Although Hume launched a severe attack on the physical law of causality, this 
law continued to play a crucial role in the development of modern philosophy. 
The 18th philosopher, Immanuel Kant, is famous for his observation that he 
was always intrigued by the starry sky above which is governed by the 
4
universal law of causality and by the moral law within me.
The classical school in economics (Adam Smith and his followers), advanced 
the idea of an “Invisible Hand” regulating economic affairs according to exact 
(natural) laws, such as the law of supply and demand. The assumption of this 
idea is that the law-conformative nature of economic systems will cause a 
tendency towards a true physical equilibrium. This idea obtained such a 
dominant place in the economic thought of the classical school that the latter 
also became known as the general equilibrium approach. This trend of 
thought in addition gave birth to the fictitious idea of an individual acting in a 
purely rational-economic way, the homo economicus, guided by nothing else 
but the greed and self-interest of every individual. What Mandeville called the 
“Fable of the Bees,” conjectured on this basis that when every person would 
pursue its own interest optimally, greater peace, harmony and wealth would 
emerge for all.
The modern science ideal continued to exert its influence in economic 
theorizing, both in the mentioned idea of “exact” economic laws (such as the 
law of supply and demand) and in a physicalistic understanding of an 
equilibrium within a closed system. The philosophically versed German 
economist and sociologist, Othmar Spann, first of all rejects every 
individualistic approach to human society because he advanced a consistent 
5
universalist stance . He also rejects the views of the theory of marginal utility in 
favour of “equilibrium or equivalence” (Spann, 1930:281). For Spann the idea 
of equilibrium is even more important than that of supply and demand. 
4
“Der bestirnte Himmel über mir, und das moralische Gesetz in mir” – Kant, 1790, A:289.
5
Spann criticizes individualism extensively in his work Gesellschaftslehre (Spann, 1950:65-92) and explains his universalistic approach 
subsequently (Spann, 1950:92-184).
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He writes: “For price does not arise out of the encounter of subjective 
estimates of value in the market, nor yet out of the encounter of supply and 
demand (Menger, Cassel), but out of the relations of magnitude in the 
articulated structure of an economy, price being the expression of these 
relations in accordance with the principle of equilibrium” (Spann, 1930:281-
282; Spann, 1935:186 ff.). 
A contemporary of Spann, the well-known social-economic thinker, Vilfredo 
Pareto, appreciates the actions of individual human beings as the molecules 
constituting a social system (Pareto, 1963, cf. par.2080). For him society is 
therefore a system in equilibrium with a number of inter-dependent elements 
which, with the aid of the mathematical concept of function, must be studied in 
quantitative terms. When society offers resistance to internal and external 
forces, the outcome will be a recovery of the previous situation: “A society 
where this occurs can therefore be considered as being in a state of 
equilibrium, and of stable equilibrium” (Course d'Economie Politique (1896), 
par.585, translated by Finer, 1966:104). Although D'Alembert's mechanics 
allows for the study of the dynamical condition of a system, both economics 
and sociology must, according to Pareto, “consider a series of static equilibria 
rather than the dynamic equilibrium” (Finer, 1966:104).
It should be remembered that John Locke, with his idea that the state should 
leave room for a free inter-play of forces within civil society, endorsed the basic 
convictions of the classical school in economics. The effect of this marriage is 
captured in the slogan, laissez-faire, laissez-passer, which aimed at less 
governmental interference and more civil freedom. Locke appealed to the 
idea of the public good (salus publica): “Salus populi suprema lex is certainly 
so just and fundamental a rule, that he who sincerely follows it cannot 
dangerously err” (Locke, 1690, § 58, page 197). The question is whether the 
“public good” is identical to the will of the majority? How does one count the 
majority? Through the property owned by individuals? Since Locke does not 
give an answer to these questions, his political theory, which actually is 
nothing but a continuation of the state of nature endowed with a coercive 
power, could equally terminate in state-nihilism or, alternatively, in state 
absolutism and totalitarianism.
The first extreme of this dilemma left the economic interests of workers within 
the new factories unprotected. The only consolation the workers had was that 
the (exact) law of supply and demand will determine what happens. In 
practical terms the views of Smith and Locke turned things around for the 
workers in England. The protection of the workers by the English Government 
dates back to the seventeenth century when it even prescribed a minimum 
wage and as late as 1756 we saw the enactment of a law empowering the 
British courts to establish wages for piece-work. However, the events 
following this legacy soon revealed the absence of a concern for the destiny of 
the economic interests of the workers.
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Herman Strauss points out that from the very next year (1757) the English 
government started to repeal legislation protecting the workers in England. 
When, in 1776, a protest was raised against the “spinning jenny,” the Lower 
House would not receive a petition from the workers: “The British Parliament 
would no longer support a labour policy which protected the worker against 
extortion and reduced ('sub-minimal') wages – that was a job which could 
safely be left to the operative economic 'laws'. … In 1799 this 'hands-off' policy 
reaches its zenith in the legal prohibition of all workers' associations in 
England. In the era shortly to dawn, the wage-earner of the nineteenth century 
was to appear upon the stage with new, more powerful weapons than the 
loosely organized and relatively uncoordinated associations of his wage-
earning ancestor.” (Strauss, 1970:7).
These developments embodied the overall effect of the theoretical guidance 
of the classical liberal idea of the state (John Locke) and the classical school of 
economics (Adam Smith) in England (and Western Europe). Perhaps the 
slogan laissez-faire, laissez-passer captures this effect in the best way. The 
newly emerging industrial societies refrained from protecting the economic 
legal interests of their workers. This neglect gave rise to the labour 
movements which eventually radically changed the political scene. Labour 
Parties now directed themselves at the sectional interests of labourers. To this 
end also trade unions emerged. The Labour Parties thus “served” the genesis 
of the prominent totalitarian régimes of the early 20th century (with their 
universalist ideologies – in the Italy of Mussolini and the Germany of Hitler). 
This finally led to the Second Word War. Clearly, modes of explanation 
exploring an overextended employment of natural scientific perspectives 
have had immense practical consequences in economic and political life.
Apart from the misunderstanding of economic life within a differentiated 
society, the Smith-Locke legacy in addition operated with an idea of the state 
that cannot account for its inner sphere of competence and intrinsic limits. Yet 
once the jural aspect of the state is recognized as the guiding perspective 
within its structural principle, it is immediately clear that the state has to 
balance and harmonize a multiplicity of legal interests within its territory by 
binding them together in one public legal order. Economic life differentiates 
into “productive units” known as firms or business enterprises on the one hand 
and the free market on the other (lacking a relation of super- and sub-
ordination). The moment the state is stripped of its normative task to bind 
together the legal interests of its citizens, it may leave open the non-state 
spheres of life to be exploited, for example by large industries. While 
governments did not protect the economic legal interests of workers, Western 
societies witnessed the rise of trade unions and also of labour parties, which 
had a substantial share in the political history of Europe during the 20th 
century.
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6. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN MODAL LAWS AND TYPE LAWS
At this point the idea of a norming law (normativity) requires a closer analysis. 
Both a firm and the state function within the economic aspect of reality. In 
respect of both, it is meaningful occasionally to identify economically sound 
and un-economic actions. This contrary, however, has a general scope, 
without any typicality. The economic aspect, just as every other aspect, 
displays its modal universality in the fact that whatever there is functions within 
all aspects of reality – and therefore also within the economic aspect. Modal 
laws and modal norms hold for all kinds of entities. But the law for being a state 
or being a firm no longer displays this unrestricted universality present in 
modal universality. States and firms are distinct in the sense that they are 
determined and delimited by specific type laws. Type laws only hold for a 
limited class of entities, namely those belonging to that specific type. The 
universality of type laws is therefore restricted (specified): the law for being a 
state or being a firm is universal in the sense that it holds for all states and all 
firms, but since not everything in the universe is a state or a firm their 
respective type laws are limited to a specific class of entities, namely those 
belonging to its peculiar type. It is therefore imperative to distinguish between 
modal laws (with an unspecified universality) and type laws (with a specified 
universality).
One implication of the distinction between modal laws and type laws is the 
insight that the business enterprise and the state function within the economic 
aspect according to their respective type laws. 
When the general structure of the economic aspect is abstracted the typical 
differences between states and firms are left aside. Likewise, 
thermodynamics as a general functional physical discipline abstracts from the 
typicality of physical entities – it is not interested in the gaseous, solid, or fluid 
state as such. Both a state and a business enterprise can waste their money 
(and thus act uneconomically) and both ought to function in a way that is 
guided by economic considerations of frugality. Yet this can only be said in 
view of the modal universality of the economic aspect, while disregarding the 
typical nature of the business and the state.
Traditionally it was foremost biology that explored a typological mode of 
thinking. Initially (already in the thought of Aristotle) it was done through the 
distinction between genera and species (a genus proximum and differentia 
specifica), and eventually in terms of the well-known biological classification 
commencing at the level of species and from there proceeds, by successively 
lifting out more general features, up the ladder of genera, families, orders, 
classes and phyla (within one or another realm).
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In order to acquire scientific knowledge of the type law of specific kinds of 
entities, an empirical investigation is needed, involving, in the case of the 
natural sciences, empirical testing through experimentation – the relative 
merit of positivism! Already Kant had to distinguish between the supposedly 
universally valid a priori thought categories on the one hand and so-called 
empirical laws of nature on the other:
We rather have to distinguish empirical laws of nature, which always 
presuppose particular perceptions, from the pure or general natural 
laws, which, without having a foundation in particular perceptions, 
only contain the conditions of their necessary connection in an 
experience. In respect of the latter nature and possible experience 
are entirely the same; and since within these the law-conformity of the 
necessary connection of appearances in an experience (without 
which we are totally incapable of knowing any object of the world of 
the sense), actually is based upon the original laws of the 
understanding, so it initially does sound strange, but it is nonetheless 
certain, when I state with respect to the latter: understanding creates 
its laws (a priori) not out of nature, but prescribes them to nature 
6
(Kant, 1783:320; § 36).
This distinction clearly runs parallel to the above-mentioned distinction 
between modal laws and typical laws (type laws). Whereas Kant ought to 
receive credit for wrestling with the dimension of modal universality, positivism 
and neo-positivism, as mentioned above, ought to be acknowledged for their 
emphasis on experimental testing (not the same as: verifying!). Only by 
studying the orderliness or law-conformity of entities is it possible to arrive at 
an understanding of the type laws holding for the limited class of entities that 
are subject to their respective type laws.
In the light of our preceding analysis the general perspective is clear: temporal 
reality as we know it displays a rich variety of modal aspects and concrete 
(natural and social) entities, delimited and determined by (unspecified) 
universal modal laws and (specified) type laws – differentiated into natural 
laws (which are valid) and cultural norms or principles, dependent upon 
7
human intervention to attain a positive shape.
We have used the example of avoiding legal excesses, which exhibited an 
instance of an intermodal connection on the norm side of the jural aspect. The 
economic analogy within the structure of the jural aspect serves as the basis 
for this general legal principle: avoid all legal excesses.
6
The logician, Christoph Sigwart, captured this insight by distinguishing between an “empirically universal judgment and that which is 
unconditionally universal” (Sigwart, 1895:160).
7
Windelband, who contributed substantially to the distinction between natural laws and norms, still continued the original Kantian approach 
which rooted universal natural laws in human understanding. Windelband does not accept the ontic status of normativity. He rather falls back 
into the dualism of fact and value, because according to him natural laws belong to the judging reason whereas norms belong to the evaluating 
reason (Windelband, 1924a:67; compare also Windelband, 1924).
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7. N AT U R A L  L AW S  E X E M P L I F Y I N G  I N T E R - M O D A L  
CONNECTIONS
It should be noted that modal laws exemplifying inter-modal connections are 
also found in nature. Consider the irreducible meaning of the physical aspect, 
which presupposes those aspects foundational to it, namely number, space 
and the kinematic aspect of movement. The core meaning of the kinematic 
aspect comes to expression in uniform (rectilinear) motion. Another term that 
captures this core meaning is constancy. Therefore, within the modal structure 
of the physical aspect, we discern a structural moment that reminds us of what 
persists or endures over time. Within the physical aspect constancy appears 
as a structural reminder of the meaning of uniform motion. In terms of the inter-
modal connections between aspects, we may say that, in the configuration of 
energy constancy, we find an analogy of the kinematic aspect on the law side 
of the physical aspect. This argumentation enables us to arrive at a (more) 
precise formulation of the meaning of the first law. Whereas the accepted 
physical wording of this law may carry (against its true intention) an element of 
energy input (one connotation of the term maintaining / conservation), the 
designation energy constancy makes it plain that this law holds for nothing 
more and nothing less than the mere continuation of whatever 'amount' of 
energy there is. The continued existence of energy does not need any 
“holding on to” – it simply persists in the sense of remaining constant.
On the basis of a broader philosophical perspective, the well-known Dutch 
philosopher of technology, Egbert Schuurman, developed extensive and 
detailed analyses of technology, culture and society – situated within a 
penetrating understanding of the normativity involved and the meaning of 
technology (see Schuurman, 1993, 1995, 2005, 2009). We conclude our 
investigation by briefly looking at logic and mathematics.
8. LOGICAL PRINCIPLES AND MATHEMATICS
Scholarship in all fields (the natural sciences and the humanities) are 
dependent upon an understanding and application of logical principles. We 
are used to the suffix “logy” in expressions such as “bio-logy,” psycho-logy,” 
socio-logy,” theo-logy” and so on. However, what we do not always realize is 
that the normative meaning of logical principles has its foundation in the inter-
modal connections between the logical-analytical aspect and the various 
aspects of nature. Logical analysis is always concerned with identification and 
distinguishing. In our brief analysis of energy-constancy we actually identified 
constancy as the pre-condition of change, thus highlighting that change can 
only be established on the basis of something constant, This shows that the 
practice of (mathematical) logic to speak of constants and variables relies 
upon the coherence between the logical-analytical aspect and the core 
meaning of the kinematic and physical aspects.
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When someone makes any kind of tool or when an engineer designs any 
technological device, such a person has to be able to identify and distinguish 
properly. But this is impossible apart from the interconnections between the 
logical-analytical aspect and the aspects of number and space – those 
aspects which delimit the field of investigation of the discipline of 
mathematics. 
Our awareness of identity in the first place relates to a discrete quantity which 
makes it possible to distinguish whatever has been identified. From the 
quantitative perspective a mathematician holds that x is different from y (x ≠ y). 
In addition to this combination of the meaning of analysis and that of 
(numerical) discreteness the primitive meaning of space, namely continuous 
extension (which is synonymous with the notion of a totality and the 
accompanying relation between a whole and its parts), is also present since in 
order to identify and distinguish entails subdivisions within a given domain, 
field, or totality.
On the norm side of the analytical aspect the presence of a logical unity and 
multiplicity ultimately serves as the foundation for the logical principles of 
identity and non-contradiction – whatever is distinctly identified is identical to 
itself. And the logical principle of non-contradiction demands that whatever is 
distinct is not identical. This means that the numerical analogy on the norm 
side of the analytical aspect constitutes the two sides of unity and multiplicity. 
This analogy therefore serves as the basis of the two most basic logical 
principles guiding every act of identification and distinguishing. 
Human beings have the freedom to identify and distinguish properly or 
improperly. When our identification and distinguishing conform to the logical 
principles of identity and non-contradiction, the former is achieved, while the 
latter prevails when the normative appeal of these principles is violated. The 
unity and diversity within reality thus make possible all identification and 
distinguishing – guided by the normative demand to identify A with A and to 
distinguish A from non-A.
Shaping tools and designing the devices needed by engineers will collapse if 
these logical principles are not properly observed. Even within the field of 
mathematics alternative accounts of the inter-modal coherence between the 
logical-analytical aspect and the aspects of number and space caused a 
divergence – owing to its peculiar approach intuitionist mathematics rejects 
crucial parts of classical mathematics while reaching results without a 
counter-part in classical mathematics.
Within mathematical logic intuitionism rejects the universal applicability of the 
principle of the excluded middle because it does not allow for infinite totalities. 
If no (infinite) totality is given, no clear-cut division of a whole is possible 
implying that in the case of division no third possibility is given. 
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Therefore, if the infinite is merely understood as something without an end, 
that is, endless in the sense of the potential infinite or the successive infinite, 
then the principle of the excluded middle cannot be unaccepted. But when 
infinite totalities are accepted, the principle of the excluded middle holds in the 
case of the actual infinite or the at once infinite. In the latter case a strict 
either/or is possible.
Within the numerical aspect the spatial whole-parts relation is imitated, for 
example in the notion of fractions (“whole” and “broken” numbers). But since a 
(spatial) whole is given at once the idea of the at once infinite is based upon a 
forward-pointing analogy of space on the law-side of the numerical aspect 
(real numbers imitate spatial continuity). 
However, in order to ensure the universal applicability of this logical principle, 
which also applies to the infinite, the (irreducible) meaning of the at once 
infinite must be acknowledged since the latter in itself is completely dependent 
on the irreducibility of the spatial order of simultaneity with its implied correlate, 
the whole-parts relation.
The numerical analogy within the structure of the logical-analytical aspect 
obtains a deepened meaning under the anticipatory guidance of the idea of 
the at once infinite. Therefore in this case we are justified in accepting the 
universal applicability principle of the excluded middle also within the domain 
of the infinite as well.
Mathematics, therefore, benefits from an understanding of the meaning of the 
principle of the excluded middle in terms of an analysis of the coherence 
between the logical-analytical aspect and the aspects of number and space. 
Mediated by
the (retrocipatory) analogy of number within the structure of analysis, 
this principle finds its ultimate foundation in the numerical anticipation 
to the meaning of space. This justifies the claim that the ontical status 
of the principle of the excluded middle is found in the fact that it is a 
retrocipation to an anticipation! In other words, the meaning of the 
principle of the excluded middle is given in a retrocipation from the 
logical-analytical mode to the arithmetical mode, which in turn 
anticipates the factual spatial whole-parts relation in subjection to and 
determined by the spatial time order of simultaneity (see Strauss, 
2009:306).
The effects of rejecting both the principle of the excluded middle and the at 
once infinite is captured in the following significant remark of the intuitionist 
mathematician, Brouwer:
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As a matter of course also the languages of the two mathematical 
schools diverge. And even in those mathematical theories which are 
covered by a neutral language, i.e. by a language understandable on 
both sides, either school operates with mathematical entities not 
recognized by the other one: there are intuitionist structures which 
cannot be fitted into any classical logical frame, and there are 
classical arguments not applying to any introspective image. 
Likewise, in the theories mentioned, mathematical entities 
recognized by both parties on each side are found satisfying 
theorems which for the other school are either false, or senseless, or 
even in a way contradictory. In particular, theorems holding in 
intuitionism, but not in classical mathematics, often originate from the 
circumstance that for mathematical entities belonging to a certain 
species, the possession of a certain property imposes a special 
character on their way of development from the basic intuition, and 
that from this special character of their way of development from the 
basic intuition, properties ensue which for classical mathematics are 
false. A striking example is the intuitionist theorem that a full function 
of the unity continuum, i.e. a function assigning a real number to every 
non-negative real number not exceeding unity, is necessarily 
uniformly continuous (Brouwer, 1964:79).
9. SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY: THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT
The earliest phases of human history are usually captured by referring to soft 
cultures, the stone age (with various subdivisions), the bronze age and the 
iron age. Eventually the meaning of history was deepened through an 
awareness of what is historically significant – captured in inscriptions, 
monuments, written histories, and so on. The cultural differentiation of distinct 
societal spheres of life was always supported by the accompanying 
characteristic technological products of particular eras.
Accompanying the differentiation of society technological developments 
followed a corresponding historical differentiation. More recently we witness 
an amazing integration taking place, particularly exemplified in the 
multifunctional electronic device known as the cell-phone. The original 
meaning of the biotic aspect comes to expression in growth, embracing both 
differentiation and integration. All the post-biotical aspects of reality 
analogically reflect these biotical features. Therefore historical differentiation 
and integration represent distinct historical principles, just as historical 
continuity (and discontinuity) represent peculiar historical norms (based upon 
the coherence between the historical aspect and the aspect of space. Tools 
and technological devices are both founded in the cultural-historical aspect 
and qualified by this aspect, because tools and technological devices are 
made (historical foundation) in order to make something else (historical 
qualification). 
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Schuurman discusses the significance of other norming principles in his 
analysis of the meaning of modern technology. He pays attention to the 
(lingual) norm of information, the economic implications of efficiency and 
stewardship, the norm of harmony, justice, care and love, and trust 
(Schuurman, 1995:96-99).
When these norms are observed the meaning of technology blossoms:
Technology can alleviate in part the bind in which humankind naturally 
finds itself. Technology can increase life's possibilities, decrease 
physical burdens and difficulties at work, and free people from routine 
activities while opening the door to all kinds of mental and creative 
labor. Natural disasters can be averted, illnesses overcome, and, in a 
certain sense, with the aid of electronics and microprocessors, the 
deaf can hear again, the blind see, and the lame can walk again. 
Technological development can provide houses and food, supply a 
degree of social security, and increase available information so as to 
extend and deepen communication. Greater harmony between 
technology and nature is possible. Through all of this the 
responsibility of humankind grows as well. Material prosperity will not 
have a stranglehold or gain the upper hand, if it keeps in step with 
mental and spiritual well-being. The many gifts and diverse qualities 
of individuals and peoples will have a chance within technology and 
by its means. When it is situated within the perspective of an integral 
frame-work of norms that holds for all cultural activity and its hazards 
are kept within bounds, technology will make room for recreative 
activities and a rich cultural involvement that are in balance with a 
conscientious stewardship of nature (Schuurman, 1995:102).
10. CONCLUDING REMARK
In conclusion we may briefly summarize the overall perspective. The primary 
meaning of the idea of law from its inception had a universal cosmic scope. Yet 
dialectical conceptions challenged the integral unity embracing the diversity of 
laws. Already in ancient Greece the idea of an origin or point of departure 
(Archè) emerged. The idea of an eternal (moral) law (lex aeterna) was kept 
alive in Medieval Scholasticism until modern Humanism started to dominate 
the scene during and after the Renaissance. The new basic motive of nature 
and freedom guided modern philosophy towards the position eventually 
assumed by Immanuel Kant with his (dualistic) separation of nature 
(causality) and freedom. From a systematic perspective the acknowledgment 
of ontic normativity made it possible to pursue an alternative path, one in 
which the interconnections between the domains of nature and culture are 
accounted for in structural terms. It turned out that both within nature and 
within human society we have to distinguish between modal laws / norms and 
typical laws / norms. 
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Examples from everyday life, from the history of Western civilization and from 
certain theoretical disciplines, served to illustrate the practical implications of 
these distinctions. The last subsection focuses on (physical) science and (the 
logic of) mathematics and it concludes with reference to the norms guiding 
technological developments and with an assessment of the meaning of 
technology.
Thus the concern of the Journal for New Generations Sciences, namely to 
reflect on the context of science, technology, engineering and mathematics 
(STEM), was met. The ultimate perspective is rooted in the ideal of avoiding 
the deification of anything or aspect within creation, but explaining how this 
ideal follows from a non-reductionist ontology exceeds the confines of the 
present article.
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